Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)
Ish
Mishra
Introduction
Like Hobbes and Locke,
the central political concern of Jean Jacks Rousseau has also been a legitimate public authority
in agreement with them about its ultimate source – the people. But similarity
ends here. For Hobbes and Locke, even theoretically, sovereignty emanates from
the people but moves away to an external sovereign body, for Rousseau the
sovereignty mot only emanates from the people but it must stay with them. He deletes the dividing line between the
ruler and the ruled and gives the theory of popular, collective sovereignty –
the theory peoples’ ruling over themselves, something unheard of. Sovereignty
can neither be alienated nor represented. Rousseau is the first critique of not
only the liberal notion of liberty but also of liberal democracy. “Man is born free,
and everywhere he is in chains. Here’s one who thinks he is the master of others,
yet he is more enslaved than they are”. For Rousseau the humans are born free
but become unfree after being born and hence the freedom from the birth becomes
his foremost concern. The unfreedoms, or for that matter the concepts of good and evil are not creation
of some divine power but of society and hence it is the responsibility of
society to put them right. Thus Rousseau transforms the concepts of good and
evil from absolute to relative and transports them from meta-physics to social
physics. In this essay attempts shall be made to explain Rousseau’s political
theory i.e. his social contract theory of the origin of state and the system of
collective or popular sovereignty in the historical context of the
Enlightenment.
Rousseau’s 2 essays written for essay competitions organized by Dijon’ Academy, on science and culture (1749)
and on inequality (1754), generally known as first and second Discourses
respectively have drawn immense commentary beginning right from the time of the
publication of the First Discourse. These were followed by his
masterpiece The Social Contract. Some of his contemporary Enlightenment
philosophers and subsequent historians of the French Revolution (1789) accuse
him of engineering the French Revolution (1789). Some including Edmund Burke in
his Reflections on French Revolution seem to hold him responsible for
single handedly bringing about the revolution, while he had died 11 years ago. Fidel
Castro revealed in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution (1959) that he carried
a copy of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract in his
pocket during the revolutionary days and added that subsequently he preferred
reading Capital. Rousseau was an odd-man-out among the Enlightenment thinkers.
He inaugurated a new and alternative trend and perspective in the Age of
Enlightenment, the people’s perspective, though his ‘people’ excluded the half
of the human population, the women In reaction to Lockean tradition of property
based on the individualism, Rousseau eulogizes nature, the emotive aspect and
rejects the prevalent liberal notion of atomistic existence of individuals and
emphasizes their social character. ‘A’ is not a slave or master as an
individual but “in-and-through a society” under certain prevalent social
relations, that shall be defined a century later by Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, as Social Relations of Production. As we shall see subsequently,
Rousseau, in many ways, anticipates Marx and Engels. He begins the Social
Contract by his famous authoritative observation, “Man was born free and he is
everywhere in chains. Those who think themselves the masters are bigger slaves
than they.”[1]
Thus Rousseau transports the idea of good and evils from metaphysics to social
physics. If slavery is imposed by force it can and must be removed by force. Contrary to Hobbes, who was afraid of the
revolution, for Rousseau the revolution was not only desirable but possible
also, by “continuously bombarding the Bastille”[i]. Thomas Hobbes, the first liberal political theorist, creates
false dichotomy between freedom and order and advocates surrender of the
freedom for the order. For Rousseau, “To renounce freedom is to renounce one’s
humanity, one’s rights as a man and equally one’s duties.”[2] Rousseau’s solution is dialectical unity of
freedom and order. Rousseau was not a socialist; as the word appears for the
first time in 1827 in ‘Corporate’ magazine (London) but was an
ideological guide and inspiration for the leaders of the revolution (1789) and
subsequent socialist thinkers[3].
John Lock, the first recognized, organic intellectual of the new
order, the capitalism, theorizes right to unlimited property, Rousseau, in
reaction, places the blame of all the social evils at the door of the first
person, who invented property. “The first man, who having enclosed a piece of
land, bethought himself of saying that ‘this is mine and found people simple
enough to believe him, was the real founder of the civil society.”[4] Against the direct-indirect liberal
defense of growing inequalities, Rousseau proves that there can be freedom with
equality or there can be no freedom. Freedom is total not more or less. As we
shall discuss subsequently, Rousseau rejects the liberal notion of freedom as
illusion and links individual freedom with social freedom, if one wants to be
free one has to free the society, as humans are not atomistic individuals but
social beings. At a time when the Enlightenment philosophers were celebrating
the individual, the self-seeking, possessive individual,
as laid down in the writings of Hobbes and Locke in the 17th century[5], his theory of the civil
religion and collective will was considered to be a deviation from the values
of Enlightenment, an utopia, a fantasy by his fellow philosophers[6]. With this introductory
prelude, we seek to analytically overview his time; life experiences’; context
and the ideas. Like lock, Rousseau also uses the Hobbesian thought experiment
involving three interlinked concepts of State of Nature; laws of nature and
social Contract but reverses their meaning to arrive at contrary conclusion.
Against Hobbes’s Absolute sovereign, Rousseau theorizes the popular sovereignty.
A biographical note
“Rousseau
was the first political thinker to make a text of his own life.”[7] The Confessions and Rousseau:
The Judge of Jean Jacques are in a way, apologies for a life that has gone
waste, as he thought in the last stage of life. In History, things might have
happened in so many permutations and combinations, but historically in only
one, in which they happened. Notwithstanding Rousseau’s guilt conscience of not
having lived up to his potentialities, he left behind a great intellectual
treasure for the posterity, by giving a new perspective to political theory –
the peoples’ perspective. Normally the philosophers belong to the class
of gainfully unemployed and view at physical labour and hence the labourer with
a philosophical contempt[8]. Exceptionally, Rousseau,
a common man himself, was the spokesperson of common people, but many things
about him, beginning with the circumstances of his birth have been quite
uncommon, including his heterodox views among the
Enlightenment philosophers. Born as the second son of Isaac Rousseau, a watch maker by profession, in Geneva in 1712, Jean Jacks lost his mother
shortly after the birth. He was nurtured and pampered by aunts and the nurses.
Isaac Rousseau was not a successful artisan but was a man of cultural test. He
would read to his sons and make them
read for him the
classics, novels, history and heroic stories of Plutarch.
That is why Rousseau would boast that he was a Roman before he was twelve, though his reading of
Plutarch had stopped before he was ten, when he was fully orphaned as his
father had fought a duel with a neighbor that obliged him to banish from Geneva
and the sons were boarded out with a Calvinist pastor and his sister[9]. Rousseau’s life can be
broadly divided into following 5 stages:
1. 1712-1728. The
circumstances of childhood and experiences of early apprenticeship have not
been quite normal. As mentioned above, Jean Jacques was almost a born
half-orphan and became full-orphan before he was 10. His father banished from
Geneva, consequent to a sword duel[10] abandoning him and his
brother to their fate. He was admitted to a school by one
of his uncles, who took care of him but soon he dropped out without learning
anything. Then he helped him to a clerical job in a law firm from where he was
thrown out owing to “indiscipline”. At the age of 13,
he joined apprenticeship with an engraver, at whose house he lived. There is no
scope to go into his reflection upon and introspection of his experiences
during this time, described in his autobiography, the Confessions, which
is found by some of its reviewers, “embarrassingly frank”[11]. Recalling those days,
Rousseau notes, “My trade did not displease me in itself. …….. I should perhaps have succeeded, if the brutality
of my master and excessive constraint had not disgusted me from the work.”[12] One Sunday evening in March
1728, unmindful of time, when he returned from a walk in the country, city
gates were closed. He could have spent the night out as few times before, but
fearing scolding and beating by the Master next morning and also to seek
adventures and new avenues of identity and the recognition, young Jean Jacques,
not yet 16, decided not to return. He set out on a voyage not knowing where to?
Thus, Rousseau’s first experience of the employment was that of dependence and
bondage and hence his cynical passion against all kindz of unfreedoms does not
surprise, when he says, “No one shall be allowed to disobey The General Will,
in other words, everyone shall be forced to be free”[13]. It appears that Rousseau
might have abstracted the idea of natural human as a free innocent being from
his own childhood experiences. As he confesses in the Confessions, he
was a mischievous, undisciplined and restless but a mature and thinking boy as
compared to other children of his age group.
2.1728-42. The
second phase of his life beginning with his self-banishment from Geneva and
wandering in various parts of France doing odd jobs like a footman with rich
ladies; self-educating through books and learning music. Wandering into
wilderness, he entered the principality of Savoy bordering Geneva, where he
found a benefactor, the baroness
de Warens, who provided him with a refuge in her home and
employed him as her steward, before finding him odd
domestic jobs with other rich ladies. She also furthered his education
to such a degree that the boy who had arrived on her doorstep as a stammering
apprentice who had never been to school developed into a philosopher, a man of
letters, and a musician.
3. 1742-49. The third phase of Rousseau’s life that could
be called the time of preparation for an exceptional philosopher is 1742-49,
when he went to Paris to seek recognition and identity in the field of music
with the new tune he had invented. Though he did not get the expected
recognition, yet he was able to perform and henceforth music tuitions became
his source of livelihood and means to contacts with the Parisian elite. Through
one of these contacts Rousseau got a small stint of diplomatic experience as a
secretary to the ambassador of Venice, a retired military officer, which
shortly ended amidst accusations and counter-accusations between the two. In
Paris he met another young man, Dennis Diderot from the countryside. The
history of humankind has also been the history of circumstantial and accidental
inventions, not only external but internal too. Rousseau, destined by
circumstances to be an artisan, through accidental circumstances, discovered a
writer in him and decided to take the “intellectual world of France by storm”
with Diderot, whose edited volumes of Philosophical Encyclopedia subsequently
became the epithet of the Enlightenment. Their plans looked overambitious but
the success they received was unexpectedly higher than the height of their
ambitions. Rousseau contributed articles on music and political economy, one of
his main intellectual concerns.
4.1749-62. The
fourth phase of his life, 1749-1762 is the most illustrious phase during which
transformed him from an ordinary music tutor to a celebrity of political
philosophy as the first critic of liberalism and liberal democracy and the
profounder of the theory of popular sovereignty, the theory of the self-rule,
unheard before. Rousseau emerged as an
original political philosopher with unprecedented impact on future politics and
political theory. Diderot had got in trouble with the authorities due to Encyclopedia.
The establishments that be, get troubled, rather terrorized with new ideas.
Diderot was also a known atheist like Voltaire. Under the pressure from clergy,
he was imprisoned and Rousseau was going to visit him in jail in Vincennes[14]. Recalling this journey in
Confessions, tells us that he had a singular experience on the journey. He
opened the newspaper, Mercure de France and read about invitation for a
prize essay competition by Dijon Academy, on the question, Have revival of arts
and science done more to corrupt or purify the morals? Rousseau informs us
that the answer came to him as sudden revelation. Nothing comes as revelation,
intellectual rebellion against the self-witnessed hypocrisies and
artificialities of refinement sophistication and luxuriousness, must have been
gaining strength for quite some time. He shared his experiences with Diderot,
who did not agree with his views that arts and science have ruined the morality
but as a journalist, encouraged him to go ahead with his unfashionable views,
which would distinguish him from other competitors. And as is history now, with
his essay winning the first prize, Rousseau, whether he liked it or not, became
famous overnight. Some commentators have rightly said that had Rousseau died
before 1749, no one would have known him. Most of the Enlightenment
philosophers were disciples of Francis Bacon[15]. They believed that the
development and organization of scientific knowledge could immensely improve
the life of humans on the earth. Diderot wrote in the preface of the 1st
Volume of Encyclopedia, “Our aim is to gather all knowledge together, so that
our decedents, being better educated may become at the same time happier and
more virtuous.”[16]
Rousseau attacked all the Baconian notions in his prize essay; science was not
saving us but was bringing moral ruins on us. When his contemporaries were
celebrating the civilizational advances, the man’s triumph over the nature by
taming it with the scientific discoveries, he eulogized the nature and accused
the civilization of ruining the humanity. At a time when
in Europe, the battle lines were drawn around contesting interpretations of the
scripture, he shocked his contemporaries by transporting the notion of good and
evil from metaphysics to social physics against the Christianity’s ethos of Sin
and Fall[17].
In this essay, Rousseau puts the blame of the evils in the society on the
civilizational advancement owing to the developments in arts and science
leading to artificial social institutions.
In his opinion the primitive humans happily lived a simple life free
from vices. A “thinking man is a depraved animal”. Instead of reason Rousseau
emphasized compassion[18].
Rousseau wrote another essay for Dijon academy in 1754 on the
question, ‘What is the origin of inequality among the men and is it
authorized by the natural law’? The essay, subsequently known as the Second
Discourse, did not get the prize but laid the foundations for an alternative
social contract theory of the origin of society and state contrary to the
theories of naturalist thinkers. It answers the first question and leaves the
answer of the second part for his next classic, The Social Contract. Rousseau’
state of nature is state of innocence. Rousseau wrote a dedicatory note in eulogy
of Geneva and Genevan culture. Some commentators have opined that one of
reasons of his doing so was to maneuver restoring his Genevan citizenship.
He did not find a congenial form of government. Seven years later with the
publication of Social Contract, also dedicated to Geneva were burnt and arrest
warrants were issued against him and once again he fled from there,
notwithstanding the fact that there are several flattering references to Geneva
in the text[19].
We shall return to the theme of Second Discourse – The state of nature and the
inequality subsequently. Since the prize essay; The Discourses on Science
and Arts, next 12 years had been creatively most illustrious years of his
life, during which he created and left behind invaluable intellectual treasure
for the posterity. Apart from working on the Social Contract during this
period, he wrote, as we saw above, The Discourse on Inequality; Emile on the
existing education system that had irked the priestly classes; his novel, Le
Nouvelle Helotse.
5. 1762-78. The last stage of Rousseau’s had been a life
on run in the literal sense, during which he was, as many commentators have
noted, a “seriously disturbed” person and often would get into the state of
paranoid[20].
With flattering references to Geneva in the Social Contract and re-conversion
into Calvinist faith, he had expected citizenship and recognition. But the
copies of the Emile and Social Contract were publicly burnt and arrest warrant
was issued against him and he fled from there. During these years of being on
run and in “seriously disturbed” state of mind, Rousseau wrote an exemplary
autobiography, The Confessions; Rousseau the Judge of Jean Jacques, a play and
constitutions of Poland and Croatia. (To be elaborated in the next editing).
The Context
After the fall of the classical Greek and Roman civilizations that
had thrived on the slave labor, the Europe witnessed a long period of economic
as well as intellectual stagnation. All the intellectual sectors were
monopolized by the theology and intellectual functions were solely performed by
the clergy. The erosion of theological explanations of the historical progress,
which had already begun during the Renaissance, had reached to its logical
conclusion by 17th-18th century known as the “the
Age of Enlightenment” or the “Age of the Reason” and also as the Age of the
scientific revolution[21].
The Renaissance was culmination of protracted intellectual dissent
against medieval values of feudalism. The theological orthodoxy severely
limited the scope of artistic/intellectual creativity, as owing to the original
sin, there can be nothing worth celebration in the phenomenal world.
Renaissance poets and artists liberated the art and poetry from theology and
Machiavelli liberated politics. Poets and artists no more wrote poems of
romance of cosmic forces or painted extra-human figures. They wrote poems of
real romance between men and women and painted the real beauties. The
democratic quality of European Renaissance was that it broke apart the birth
qualification but replaced them with more stringent qualifications of
'success'. It was celebration of "this worldliness" against the
"other worldliness". It was a celebration of individual, but of
extra-ordinary, spectacular individual, of princes not of ordinary individual
who was a tool, a dupe for princes, princes themselves were different matter[22]. Its contempt for ordinary
individual was going to transform into hefty bourgeois contempt in the coming
days. The Renaissance also witnessed the emergence of a new species of hero -
the hero of finance, the risk-free heroism. This new hero in the course of
about one and a half century acquired the center-stage when its first,
recognized philosopher, John Locke, categorically declared that governance is a
serious matter it could be entrusted with those who have already proved their
worth by amassing sufficient wealth.[23]
Beginning with Thomas Hobbes, the liberal assumption that society
consists of free and equal individuals, was not a call for freedom and equality
but to conceal the new inequalities and unfreedoms, the immanently innate
attributes of the new, bourgeois social order, a reflection of its perennial
duality. As he recalls in the Confessions that
after coming in contact with practical politics, in accordance with his
conviction of redemption through political change, he undertook a larger work
on body politic in 1743[24].
But, as he confesses in the microscopic preface of Social
Contract that it was an over ambitious beyond the “limits of” his “power”.
Yet what he produced became a classic and a reference point of future
politico-economic analysis for both the theoretical perspectives – egalitarian
and hierarchal; individualist and collectivist; bourgeois and proletarian. He
in many ways anticipates Marx and Engels that I shall point to in subsequent
discussion. His theory of General Will as a moral entity – a
theory of participatory democracy – has such a lasting impact on the future
politics and political theory that even the liberal democratic states are forced to place
“the people” in the center of the preamble of their constitution. Even the staunch
pro-corporate parties are forced to name themselves as peoples’ parties.
The idea of liberal democracy remains complex and contested. The
philosophical developments towards liberal democratic state in the works of
Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, James mill and John Stuart Mill consist of
heterogeneous sets of assumptions and conclusions and have been matter of
debate in Anglo-American intellectual world. Rousseau, the first critic of
liberal democracy at its formative stage itself[25], propounded the theory of the
direct, participatory democracy – of The General Will.
At a time when even the
universal franchise was a distant dream in the mother country of the liberal or
representative democracy, England, Rousseau’s theory of peoples’ government,
the deletion of the dividing line between the ruler and the ruled was found to
be a socking and was dubbed as fantasy, by his contemporaries[26]. In fact, he was quite ahead
of his time. He had direct influence on and anticipated in many ways, as shall
be discussed in subsequent sections, the key counterpoint to liberal democracy
-- the Marxism. Against the liberal tradition of the concept of universal man
as a possessive rational egoist, Rousseau conceptualized the universal, natural
individual as rational, innocent, compassionate and benevolent. As Sudipta
Kaviraj has rightly said that Rousseau was a romantic rebel against the Locke’s
tradition, which eulogized property. In reaction he eulogized the nature, the
emotive aspect of it. In contrast with Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau’s
natural individual is an innocent being, neither good nor bad that he becomes
in and through society under the institutions he lives in[27]. Rousseau became a legend in his own life time
and was arrogantly aware of his importance and ability to convince the ordinary
people, the new people disenchanted with the bondage of inequality and the
suffering about the need of the social transformation. Rousseau, is exceptional
exception among the Enlightenment philosophers, as he brought in and so firmly
established the common man -- Aam Aadmi – on the center stage of the
philosophical and political discourse that forced the writers of the modern
constitutions to begin the preamble with reference to, “we the people”, though
they do not mean it – the innate contradiction of the theory and the practice.
Rousseau, the first critic of liberal freedom and the self-declared
spokesperson of common man and common sense, redefined the freedom that is
known as positive freedom. Linking liberty with equality he gave the
revolutionary call of “continuously bombarding the Bastille”. In contrast to
liberal notion of individual liberty in separation from society, Rousseau
defined liberty in and through a society. In order to be free, the society has
to be freed. By inventing the new protagonist in the collectivity of the
people, Rousseau anticipated Marx's invention of proletariat as the future
protagonist of the history. Rousseau proved that revolution was not only desirable
but possible also.
Rousseau was a romantic rebel against the Locke’s tradition of
political theory that eulogized the property. In reaction Rousseau eulogized
the nature, the emotive aspect of human nature and put the blame of all the
evils at the door of the man who invented the property, i.e. the private
property that created inequality and social injustice sanctified by law. (Why
romantic? We shall discuss little later.)For Rousseau, morality was not a
theological but political issue. In fact in his view, politics ‘founds’
morality. For him the ethical task of triumph of good over evil is not a
spiritual issue but a task of political transformation of society. Thus
Rousseau begins his theorization with transporting of the issue of the evil
“from the camp of ‘theodicy’ into that of ‘politics’ and the origins of evils
is no more attributed to an obscure wish of God or to some presumed original
sin of man but is placed squarely on society.”[28] Rousseau pushes the old
problem of evil out of the sphere of metaphysics and transfers it to the center
of social physics – ethics and politics and turns it into the problem of the
critique of civil society, releasing a stimulus of unprecedented power. As evil
for Rousseau is not a metaphysical matter but the product of a determinate
organization of society and therefore the elimination of the evil coincides
with the problem of social transformation, i.e. with the problem of Revolution.
In 17th-18th centuries, when the dogma
of the ‘original sin’ that the roots of evil are in human nature, was the mantra of
the Catholic and Protestant faiths, Rousseau’s denial of it was found
inexorably shocking by the both. Rousseau transforms the whole perspective on
human existence. ‘Salvation’ is no more a subject of religious terrain but of
politics. Redemption is possible only by man by destroying the coercive form of
the society and replacing it by a free and ethical political community, and not
by any external aid (“no God can give us it”). Voltaire, Diderot, d’ Alembert and
all the other philosophes see it as ‘mere defects of society,
mistake in organization that could be gradually eliminated, Rousseau considers
the evils of the society as ‘sin’ that can be redeemed by transforming the
society from its very foundations.
State of nature and the origin of inequality
Differences of interpretation of the Discourse on the origin of
inequality began with its publication itself and persist till date. It is
basically Rousseau’s explanation of the existing miseries on the earth. Lucio
Colletti, with reference to various recent studies zeroes on two
interpretation. Though Rousseau claims historicity to his description of State
of nature but his historicity is speculative to present his State of Nature as “a 'reference
concept', a hypothesis, a degree zero, by which to measure the 'divergence' of
each individual phase of human civilization with respect to the original
conditions.”[29]
The second, much more serious position is that in his works Rousseau is
inviting society to choose the savage existence rather than society ('he wants us
to walk on four legs', Voltaire wrote sarcastically). This notion of
primitivism associated with Rousseau’s work has survived till date despite his
warning in the Second Discourse itself. “What, then, is to be done? Must
societies be totally abolished? Must mine and yours be annihilated, and must we
return again to the forests to live among bears? This is a deduction in the
manner of my adversaries, which I would as soon anticipate as let them have the
shame of drawing.”[30]
In order to understand Rousseau’s views on State of Nature; Social
Contract and sovereignty, it would be appropriate to compare and contrast them
with the views of natural theory tradition, particularly, those of John Locke. For
Hobbes the state of nature is a horrifying hell, a state of war of all against
all, in which everyone lives under the constant fear of sudden death. For Locke
the State of Nature is already a moral and a social state, a state of “happy
freedom”, under the laws of the nature. Everyone has natural rights including
right to property and right to sell and buy labor. For Rousseau State of nature
is nothing of these sorts. It is just a state of innocence. Humans are just solitary
natural beings distinguished by the species-specific faculties of
self-improvement and compassion. Other human faculties are latent to be
realized ‘in and through the society’. Humans, as Hobbes would like us to
believe are not wicked by nature but they become so through socialization. “Man
is born free but is everywhere in chains”.[31] As mentioned above state of
nature for him is a point of reference. For Locke humans in the state of nature
are already moral beings living under the natural laws with natural rights. In Rousseau the idea
of the 'state of nature' is quite different. In fact such a state to him is not
a 'moral' condition but a state of innocence, a purely animal condition, beyond
the distinction between good and evil.
Rousseau’s account of historical development from the state of nature, the state of innocence to
the mess, which the modern society has got into, has been adequately summarized
by Lucio Colletti into four stages:
1.
The stage of innocent
solitary being, with easily appeasable needs, which is distinguished from the
other members of the animal-kingdom by the species-specific, attributes of
self-improvement and compassion. Other human species-specific faculties are
latent, unawaken, which get actualized in and through society. In other words.
2.
With protracted
technical revolutions and many revolutionary inventions like language, fire,
metallurgy, art of building shelters etc., people started living in families
and communities, what he calls patriarchal society, the golden period, for
Rousseau.
3.
“Just
as man lost the idle condition of the 'state of nature', giving himself up to
labour and to thought (to the use of reason, which together with language
develops from the consolidation of the first social relations), so now he comes
to a new fall which wrenches him from the happiness of the 'patriarchal' state.
By an 'unhappy chance' men discover the advantages of the 'division of labour',
which enables them to pass from a subsistence economy to an economy of
productive development 'It was iron and corn which first civilized men, and
ruined humanity.[32]'
Now producing more than they really need, men vie for the surplus. They want
not only to use things but to possess them. They want not only present goods,
but the abstract tokens of possible, future goods.
4.
The consequence is the
Hobbesian state needing civil order. With their security threatened men come
together to form a civil order but the socialization went wrong. They entered
into iniquitous contracts that instead of bringing about justice perpetuated
injustices. “The law was second fraud perpetrated on people”[33] that converted the theft
into legal rights. Rousseau’ solution is fundamental transformation of society
through a just Social Contract that people eager to get out of the solitary
state of nature would make.
The situation described by Rousseau reappears in Adam Smith, with
a diametrically opposite perspective and concerns, “wherever there is property,
there is inequality, for every rich man there must be at least 500 poor, and
the affluence of few presupposes the indigence of many”, and of course,
probably under TINA (There Is No Alternative) syndrome of development, supports
the “establishment of civil government” to institutionalize these inequalities
and indigence as for “the acquisition of valuables and extensive property” it
is necessarily required. Smith wanted just to explain the status quo and was
concerned with its management by a metaphorical entity “the invisible hands of
market.”[34]
Though a brief comparison between the contemporaries Smith and Rousseau
reflecting in contrasting manner upon the same issue would not be inappropriate
but that needs a separate discussion. Like the politics of Hobbes and Locke,
the political economy of Adam Smith is explanation; rationalization and
justification of the new status quo. Rousseau finds the existing societies
“rotten” and rejects their unjust structures puts forth a theoretical model of
a just, egalitarian alternative for future, modalities of which has to be
worked out by future generations.
The Social Contract
.
Hobbes begins with the basic assumption that
all the individuals are naturally free and equal and taking their particularly
socialized attributes of rational, egoist and possessiveness as their natural
attributes, proves the natural equality and freedom as antithetical to their
desire of peaceable commodious life that requires order. After drawing a
dichotomy between the freedom and the order, Hobbes makes a plea to surrender
the freedom for order. “To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to
surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties.”[35] -- Rousseau’s reaction to Hobbes’s Social
Contract of surrendering liberty to the government for social order. Thus
liberty is the key to Rousseau’s Social Contact, but not the individual liberty
in dissociation from fellow beings[36] but in association with them
falling in the category of positive liberty in Isaiah Berlin’s categorization,
which shall be briefly discussed in the subsequent sections.
In the Discourses on Inequality Rousseau poses the problems
confronting the society due to inequality among the men caused by the
institution of the private property, in the Social Contract, he
proceeds to provide solution. His solution to a real problem is a romantic, a
utopia of an ambiguous moral entity, General Will through a just
Social Contract based on the principles of equality. This envisioned contract
provides the basis and the context of the liberty, different than the liberal
notion of the liberty which excludes others to be actualized individually. Rousseau’s
liberty, different from the liberal notion, can be actualized only through
liberating the society. The liberty of the individual is, thus, intimately
linked with the liberty of society. He
ridicules the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke as the
covenants aimed at legitimating slavery. “The words ‘slavery’ and ‘right’ are
contradictory, they cancel each other out. Whether between one man and another
or between one man and the whole people, it would always be absurd to say: I
hereby make a covenant with you, which is wholly at your expense and wholly to
my advantage; I will respect it so long as I please and you shall respect it so
long as I wish.”[37] Rousseau seeks a just contract by which one
can ‘live as free as before’. Repudiating their contracts, he says, “Stipulated
in inequality, the effect of the contract is to consolidate the privileges of
the wealthy, and to give inequality the value of an institution: under that
guise of peace and right, economic usurpation becomes political power; the rich
safeguards his property with a right which did not previously exist, and from
then on they are the masters. This abusive contract is a caricature of the true
contract.”[38]
Rousseau not only demolishes the edifice of the existing contract
theories but also provides a new alternative theory of contract for the “men
being taken as they are”. Rousseau acknowledges that the acquired attributes of
wrong socialization could not be unlearned and hence going back to state of
nature is impossible. In Confessions he underlines the primary cause of
unhappiness as the division of ‘civil’ life into self’s sense of right
(justice) and the self’s sense of self-interest and their contradictions. The
solution is their merger. He sets the agenda at the outset of the Social
Contract, “I mean to inquire if, in the civil order,
there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as
they are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall endeavor always to
unite what right sanctions with what is prescribed by interest, in order that
justice and utility may in no case be divided.”[39]
Like Hobbes and Locke, he too is concerned with the legitimate and
secure principle of government based on the principles of equality and justice[40].Hobbes and Locke located the
source of the validity of the legitimate authority in people. Rousseau takes it
further to a radical point by saying that not only sovereignty emanates from
the people but it must stay also with them, as “Sovereignty cannot be
represented or alienated”[41]. Unlike the Contracts of
Hobbes and Locke, his Social Contract does not propose to
transfer the sovereignty from people to the government but creates a
possibility of self-regulation and a participatory democracy. “Sovereignty not
only originates from the people; it ought to stay there”[42]. “The sovereign authority is
the people making the rules by which they live”[43]. Thus Rousseau propounds the
theory popular sovereignty, the collective power of self-rule.
Thomas Hobbes stipulates a single contact in which the rational,
egoist solitary beings of state of nature, who not only can’t live in
cooperation with each other but are after each other’s life are driven by the prudence
of fear to get together and hold covenant of transferring their all the natural
rights and power to a powerful authority, which can overawe each of them to
facilitate peaceable commodious life. He creates a dichotomy between freedom
and order, Rousseau proves them to be complementary. John Locke’s theory
presupposes double covenants: one by which individuals, who already are moral
beings with all the rights of bourgeois society including right to
accumulate property and right to sell and buy labour in the state of nature,
agree to unite in a society for mutual safety and preservation and then
transfer the power for the self-preservation of the natural rights to the
sovereign, i.e. the state by another contract. Rousseau resolves the
duality by attributing sovereignty to the people as a whole and transforming
the government as a mere commission for executing the instructions of the
sovereign. In reaction to liberal contracts aimed at perpetuating the
inequality and un-freeing the free-born human, his solution is: the Popular
Sovereign – the General Will – self-government of the people, something unheard
before, was indeed radical. It was termed as Rousseau’s romanticism.
He was much ahead of his time. In 18th century Europe the
idea of ‘ordinary’ people as integral part of governance, was found to be
shockingly unbelievable. The first recognized liberal democrat, John Stuart
Mill, writing almost a century after the publication of the Discourses and
the Social Contract, is a reluctant democrat with a Platonic
disbelief in the ‘ordinary’ people, pleads for a weighted franchise tilted in
favor of ‘extra ordinary’ – “the talented and able” –“who happen to own
property and social prestige.” Rousseau’s this originally and fundamentally new
concept of popular sovereignty with the emphasis on ‘people themselves’ has
compelled all the modern states to incorporate, at least, theoretically, the
importance of the ‘ordinary people’ by beginning the preludes of their
constitutions in the name of ‘we the people’. He agrees with the preceding
social contract thinkers that Sovereignty emanates from the people but adds to
it that it must stay with them. Rousseau’s solution envisages the
individuals directly involved in creating the laws by which they live. This
individual, who in order to be social; to materialize the humanly
potentialities of the state of nature; and of course to be free, enters into a
contract with his fellow men to transform the isolated individuals into their collectivity
with a collective will in the popularly agreed common interest. He sets
for himself the task of finding “A form of human association which will
defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all,
and under which each individual, while uniting him with others obeys no one but
himself and remains as free as before”[44].
The Social Contract does not envisage surrender of all
(Hobbes) or some (Locke) rights and powers to an external authority as cost of
living a social life. Rousseau resolves the duality by conceptualizing popular
sovereignty into collectivity of the people. In ordinary (i.e. civilized)
societies people have split personalities with “self’s sense of right” and
self’s sense of self interest. Corresponding to the self’s sense of self
interest and its sense of justice, individuals in the civil society have self-concerning,
particular will and socially concerned real will. The General Will is sum total
of real will. "Each
of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction
of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole." Thus what one gives from
one hand as a solitary individual receives from other hand as equal, integral
part of collectivity. Rousseau conceptualizes an active citizenry involved in
the developing process of the government -- all the citizens should meet
and collectively decide the best for the community and enact appropriate Laws.
He does away with the distinction of governed and the governor. The governed is
the governor among the community of equals. Root cause of miseries on the
earth, the inequality is replaced by fraternal solidarity. Rousseau
The General Will
In his radical alternative of people’s self-governance, Rousseau
transported the liberty from individual to society as individuals do not exist
as individuals but ‘in and through society. It squarely holds the society
responsible for “chaining” the “born free”. In Social Contract, he undertakes
the task of finding an association where natural freedom can be restored by
transforming the ‘chaining’ institution, the society. To be free one has to
free the society. In an unfree society, the idea of the freedom is an illusion.
Rousseau’s emphasis on “as free as before” looks paradoxical, as in his state
of nature, man is not yet man but potentially man, an innocent being with
natural attributes of compassion, self-preservation and self-improvement. Other
human specific attributes are latent to be actualized in society. In state of
nature the solitary being does not know what freedom or unfreedoms is.
Rousseau’s incoherence is made up by his intentions of theorizing a
non-coercive state free from exploitation and inequality. At the outset of the Social
Contract he makes his intention clear. “My purpose is to consider if, in
political society, there can be legitimate and sure principle of the
government, taking the men as they are and the laws as they might be. In this
inquiry, I shall try always to bring together what right permits with what
interest prescribes so that justice and utility are in no way divided.”[45] By “taking men as they are”, Rousseau admits
the fact that self-interest had become fact of life and cannot be totally done
away with. Freedom of State of the state of Nature is permanently lost.
Rousseau thus dubs the
liberal and naturalist notions of liberty as merely independence and contrasts
it with his newly drawn definition of liberty, “two things so essentially
different, that they reciprocate in excluding each other”. Liberty is
intimately connected with equality: acting at pleasure might displease others;
and “this is not properly called a free state. Liberty consists
less in acting according to one’s own pleasure, than in not being subject to
the will and pleasure of other people. It consists also in our not subjecting
the wills of other people to our own. Whoever is the master over others, is not
free himself and even to reign is to obey”. They obey the will of ‘vices’
created by society thriving on the principles of inequality. Linking equality
with Liberty Rousseau’s Social Contract “establishes equality among the
citizens in that they …… must all enjoy the same rights”[46]. Rousseau clearly demarcates
the executive – the government – from the legislature. People form
the legislative assembly, the sovereign whose laws are executed by the
government.
For Rousseau, the
popular government, i.e. the self-government is an end in itself that leads to
the formation of a society in which the affairs of the state are integrated
into the affairs of ordinary citizens. Rousseau’s contract is aimed at creating
a social-political order in which the liberty and equality of citizens can be
established and sustained. The citizens must create and be bound by ‘the supreme
direction of the General Will’ – different from the will of all -- the publicly
generated conception of common good[47], and not the mere aggregate
of the personal fancies and individual desires[48]. In this contract the
citizens are not obliged to abide by the supreme direction of some Artificial
Man, an impersonal, overawing Leviathan (Hobbes) or a constitutional Sovereign
separate from the civil society created for the protection of the pre-social,
pre-political natural rights (Locke). They abide by their own collective will –
The General Will. They abide by only those laws they have prescribed to
themselves with the public good in mind[49].
Rousseau’s solution to a
real problem – the evil – caused by the institutionalization of property and
inequality is an ambiguous moral entity -- the General Will –
the collective will of all the people. As the ‘evil’ is caused by the
society, the responsibility of ‘redemption’ lies with it, it has to transform
itself. Fault of logical incoherence and practical problems of construction are
pointed regarding the General Will, what makes it important is Rousseau’s
intention and commitment as a spokesperson of common man and a bearer of common
sense. Rousseau not only changed the terms of the reference in political theory
but also proposed a future paradigm of analysis and left it to be worked out by
the posterity for whom he was theorizing. Like Marx after him, whom he
not only preceded but anticipated also[50], Rousseau was an activist thinker
who was not only interested in interpreting but changing the world. He is quite
unambiguous in stressing that the revolution was both necessary and possible.
Dismissing the Hobbesian fear against revolutions he sides with it and proposes
to do away with the distinction between the ruler and the ruled in a model of
participatory democracy, a system of self-regulation and self-governance. His
solution is not ‘back to nature’, that is a historical impossibility. He finds
the existing societies corrupt and exploitative and wants to transform them
into a form of human association in which people are as ‘free as before’. He
merges the self’s sense of self-interest with the self’s sense of right.
Without going into the
details of the constitution and attributes of General Will and
its implications for the history of political theory, let us have a glance at
how he defines the term.
According to Rousseau,
every individual has two wills: particular will that he has by virtue of being
a man; and a constant or common will which he has by virtue of being a citizen.
The Particular Will, according to him, is self-oriented, driven by
individual-private desires, selfish, unstable and momentary. The common will,
which Rousseau calls the Real Will, is rational,
eternal and socially oriented on the basis of an understanding of the common
good of the whole community. The General Will is not
the Will of All but a sum total of real wills of all the citizens in the
publicly generated common interest.
There is often a great
difference between the will of all and the General Will, the latter regards only the common interest;
the former has regard to the private interest, and merely is a sum of
particular interests[51].
[2]
SC p 55
[8]
A brief note.
[9] Cranston, Maurice,
‘Introduction’ to Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Social Contract (translated
& edited by Maurice Cranston), Penguin, New York, 1968, p 10
[10]
A note on system of settling the issues through duel.
[11]
McClelland, David, The Great Political Thinkers, p.250
[12]
Cranston, op.cit.
[13]
Social Contract (SC)
[14]
A note
[17]
1st Discourse
[19]
Few quotations from SC and 2nt Discourse.
[21]
A note on Enlightenment
[22]
Kaviraj Social Scientis
[23]
Kaviraj, Social Scientist
[24]
Preface to the SC
[25]
Note
[27]
Colletti
[29]
Colleti (149)
[30]
Ibid
[31]
SC
[32]
2nd Discourse
[33]
SC
[34]
Smith Adam, Wealth of Nations
[35]
SC 6
[36]
Caudwell, Studies and further Studies in a Dying Culture
[37]
SC 58
[38]
2nd Discourse
[39]
SC p. 47
[40]
SC p.49
[41]
ibid
[42]
Cranston op.cit. p 30
[43]
Held, Davis, The Idea of Modern State, p. 48
[44]
SC, p. 60
[47]
SC pp. 60-61
[48]
SC pp. 72-73; 75
[49]
SC p. 65
[50]
Colletti, op.cit.
No comments:
Post a Comment